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By Gary L. Rodgers*
The Commissioner "Does
Not Acquiesce"
"Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spo-
ken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and
not the person who first spoke or wrote them."I
I. INTRODUCTION-THE PROBLEM STATED
Bishop Hoadly's famous quote is often cited by those who view
the judiciary as supreme over the legislature. But as the judge is
elevated above the lawmaker, the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue towers over the solon in matters of tax law. Congress may
have the first word and the courts the second, but the Conunis-
sioner has the last when exercising the power to nonacquiesce in
the precedential value of lower court decisions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer is unlikely to win in
the Tax Court-in 1978 the taxpayer won in only 11% of the opin-
ions rendered 2-- the Commissioner refused that year to accept the
precedential value of the decision in more than half of the cases it
lost.3 Taxpayers may win an occasional battle, but the Commis-
* Certified Public Accountant, Alexandria, Virginia.
1. Bishop Hoadly's sermon preached before the King, March 31, 1717 as quoted
in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmisAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (4th ed.
1975).
2. At the appellate level, taxpayers fared slightly better with a record of 15.19 in
the courts of appeals, 18.2% in the district courts and a favorable decision in
two of the six Supreme Court tax cases. IRS, DEP'T OF TREAS., Pun. No. 1076,
ANN. REP. 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 IRS REPORT].
3. The following table reflects the Commissioner's decisions regarding Tax
Court decisions during the past 13 years:
Tax Court Acquiescences Nonacquiescences
Year Decisions Number % Number 0
1967 63 54 85.7 9 14.3
1968 61 54 88.5 7 11.5
1969 65 58 89.2 7 10.8
1970 77 64 83.1 13 16.9
1971 62 54 87.1 8 12.9
1972 71 54 76.1 17 23.9
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sioner inevitably wins the war.
Yet the tax system is highly dependent upon self-assessment
and voluntarism. In 1978, gross revenue collections amounted to
$399.8 billion 4 while penalties totaling only $1.3 billion were as-
sessed with $336 million abated. 5 Based on these statistics, one
may conclude that the collections are 99.8% voluntary. Self-
assessment and voluntary compliance are basic to our system of
taxation, and success in the administration of the system is depen-
dent upon public confidence in the good faith of the Internal Reve-
nue Service.6
In order to assess taxes due, one must be able to understand
the tax system. All statutes are vague and ambiguous and most
tax assessments and court decisions relate to statutory construc-
tion. Tax laws are particularly difficult to interpret when applied
to complex transactions.7 The Internal Revenue Regulations,
Tax Court Acquiescences Nonacquiescences
Year Decisions Number % Number T
1973 81 71 87.7 10 12.3
1974 64 51 79.7 13 20.3
1975 41 25 61.0 16 39.0
1976 53 43 81.1 10 18.9
1977 40 25 62.5 15 37.5
1978 96 43 44.8 53 55.2
1979 45 39 86.7 6 13.3
Total 819 635 77.5 184 22.5
Figures obtained from the Cumulative Bulletins for years 1967-78. The 1979
statistics are from 1980-1 I.R.B. 5-6. Each case, although it may contain sev-
eral taxpayer-litigants, is counted only once. Acquiescences include the
nonacquiescences withdrawn and acquiescences in result only; it excludes
decisions also listed as nonacquiescences in the same Bulletin. For statistics
on the period 1960-66, see Comment, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescence, 40
S. CAL. L. REv. 550, 560 (1967).
4. The Internal Revenue Service received 136.7 million tax returns of all types,
with individual taxes amounting to $213.1 billion. SECRETARY OF THE TREAS.,
ANN. REP. ON THE STATE OF THE FNANCES, Doc. No. 3276, at 186 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as 1978 FINANcES REPORT].
5. Almost half of the penalties were for individual returns. Id. at 187.
6. Commissioner Caplin stated:
Our tax system is based on individual self-assessment and voluntary
- compliance. The vitality of this system hinges on the good faith of
the American people and their willingness to report their income ac-
curately. This faith is largely dependent upon the public's general
confidence that our tax laws are fair, and that they are impartially
and uniformly administered and enforced so that everyone is paying
his just share.
Internal Revenue Service Audit Guide, at Forward (1974).
7. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 656 (1954).
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designed to implement the tax laws, have been termed the world's
most confusing document. 8
To clarify these complexities, the Internal Revenue Service an-
nounces its position on tax questions in a number of ways. A pri-
vate ruling may be issued to an individual taxpayer 9 while rulings
of general interest are published as Revenue Rulings. Addition-
ally, acquiescences or nonacquiescences to Tax Court decisions
are announced in the Internal Revenue Bulletins. 0 In publishing
a determination not to acquiesce, the Commissioner is notifying
the public that a case decided in the Tax Court is not considered a
binding precedent." When decisions have been adverse to the
Service, it may continue to litigate the issue and insist that con-
tested tax returns be kept open until the issue is finally resolved-
which may take from five to fifteen years.12 The long delay while
awaiting a decision on a point of law is a major contributor to the
present state of uncertainty that permeates the tax laws and their
interpretation.13
This article will discuss whether or not the Commissioner's
nonacquiescence policy contributes to the interpretation of the
taxing scheme: Does that policy lend certainty, uniformity, and eq-
uity to the interpretation of complex tax laws and regulations, or is
it an anachronism that has outlived its usefulness? The article will
begin with a survey of the history of the 56-year-old acquiescence
program. It will trace this history from the time when the Tax
Court was an administrative forum from which either party could
appeal and the Commissioner's announcement merely served to
reduce a losing taxpayer's anxiety. Continuing the discussion, it
will be shown that the appeal period shrank to the point that publi-
8. Completing his own return, Albert Einstein is reputed to have remarked,
"[this is too difficult for a mathematician, it takes a philosopher." E. GRIS-
woLD & M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATioN 43 (6th ed. 1976). Former
Commissioner Caplin noted that "tax regulations are aimed at experts, rather
than at the man in the street." Caplin, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation,
1978 Ter=" Introduction, 33 TAx LAWYER 497, 503 (1979). In the "Flesch
scale," which tests how "readable" written material is, comic books score 92,
READER'S DIGEST rates 65, THE HARVARD LAW REviEw is 32, while the Internal
Revenue Code weighs in at minus 6. Johnson, Weighing in on the Flesch
Scale, STUDENT LAWYER, Jan., 1980, at 7.
9. Literally tens of thousands of requests for private rulings are received each
year. Through freedom of information requests and at special public reading
rooms in Service headquarters, these private rulings have become available
to other taxpayers as well. See generally Calechman, Recent Cases show need
for caution in relying on IRS rulings and acquiescences, 23 J. TAx. 122 (1965).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., 1978-2 C.B. 1.
12. SENATE JUDICIARY Comm., TAx COURT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1979, S. REP. No.




cation was anticlimatic and yet the practice was continued to pro-
vide all taxpayers with the Commissioner's current
interpretations. Thus the continuation of this practice expanded
the scope of nonacquiescence to include cases where appeal was
not contemplated.
This article will then explore the Commissioner's use of this
nonacquiescence policy to maximize the tax revenues, arguably at
the expense of principles of law and equity, in the hope that a
more favorable decision will ultimately be rendered. In view of the
infrequent review of tax cases by the Supreme Court and the re-
fusal of the Commissioner to be bound by the lower courts, this
practice leaves the taxpayer guessing as to questions of law. Even
acceptance of the Commissioner's latest position is hazardous in
tax planning because it can be changed at any time with retroac-
tive effect.
Thus, there is now no national tax law. Because the circuit
courts of appeals usually have the final word in tax matters, resi-
dents of different jurisdictions in identical circumstances may
have to pay different amounts of tax. This article contends that a
United States Tax Court of Appeals promises the best means to
achieve certainty and uniformity in tax administration. In addi-
tion, legislation introduced in the 96th Congress, could, with minor
amendments, provide the safeguards needed to maintain the tax-
payer confidence essential to a self-assessment tax system.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Why the Commissioner Nonacquiesces
The Commissioner must follow court decisions of the Supreme
Court, but he is not required to observe the decisions of the lower
courts.14 When the Commissioner follows court decisions as pre-
cedent, it is with due regard to the doctrine of stare decisis. When
a departure is made, the process is called "nonacquiescence."
Historically, the practice began in 1924 when the Tax Court was
known as the Board of Tax Appeals.' 5 At that time there was no
14. Comment, Treasury Department's Practice of Non-acquiescence to Court De-
cisions, 28 ALB. L. REv. 274, 276 (1964).
15. The Board of Tax Appeals was established by Congress as an independent
executive agency with jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies asserted by
the Service. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336 (1924). The name
was changed to the Tax Court of the United States by the Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957 (1942). Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 410 (1971).
Until the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003, 44 Stat. 110 (1926), the Board
of Tax Appeals was considered primarily an administrative rather than judi-
cial body. This meant that the losing party could bring suit in a federal dis-
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procedure for direct appeal from the Board's decision. If the Serv-
ice lost, it could bring suit in federal district court within one year
to collect any deficiency disallowed by the Board.16 In order that
taxpayers who were successful before the Board would not have to
wait a full year to find out if the service planned to appeal, the
Commissioner would publish the decision to acquiesce or nonac-
quiesce.17 Although nonacquiescences were only disclosed With
respect to Tax Court rulings, the Commissioner also established a
position on district court, court of appeals, and Court of Claims de-
cisions for the restricted use of Service personnel.18 While the
nonacquiescence procedure has never been specifically authorized
by statute,19 it has received the tacit consent of both Congress and
the courts. 20
trict court de novo, where the factual issues would be retried with the Board
of Tax Appeals decision given only prima facie evidentiary value. Revenue
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337 (1924). See also, 1B MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE ] 0.422 (2d ed. 1974).
16. A former chief counsel provided the following chronology:
The present Service policy of issuing acquiescences in Tax Court
opinions is in large degree an historical accident. The Revenue Act
of 1924 provided that the Commissioner had one year to appeal from
an adverse decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. A taxpayer receiv-
ing a favorable opinion from the Board of Tax Appeals was not at all
sure of the finality of the opinion until the appeal period had run. To
aid the petitioner, the Service began to issue acquiescences and
nonacquiescences in the Board of Tax Appeals cases. Where the
Service acquiesced it simply meant the Commissioner had deter-
mined not to appeal the case. When the Commissioner nonac-
quiesced this signaled his intention to appeal. Two years later, the
statute was amended to allow for appeals [limited to questions of
law] directly to the courts of appeals. Previously appeals lay in the
district court and the appeal time was shortened to six months. In
1932, the present rule of three months as time for appeal was insti-
tuted.
Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43
TAxEs 756, 771 (1965). See also Note, supra note 15, at 410.
17. Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy Regarding Acquiescence and Nonacquies-
cence in Tax Court Cases, 14 TAx COUNSELOR'S Q. 129, 129-30 (1970).
18. Comment, supra note 3, at 550. Internal documents of the Service explaining
the reasons behind the acquiescence or nonacquiescence to court decisions
have traditionally been withheld from the public. After refusing to even de-
cide on Freedom of Information requests for this information, the Taxation
with Representation Fund, affiliated with the non-profit Tax Analysts & Advo-
cates group, brought suit in U.S. District Court. In late January, U.S. District
Court Judge Charles R. Richey ordered the documents released. Taxation
with Representation Fund v. Internal Rev. Serv., 485 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C.
1980).
19. Having grown out of the Commissioner's power to appeal Tax Court deci-
sions, publication of nonacquiescences was not expressly authorized by stat-
ute. New Developments, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescences: Their Effect
Upon Tax Planning, 28 J. TAx. 57 (1968).
20. The procedure has been referred to in several court opinions. See the cases
19801 1005
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When, in 1932, the time period in which the Commissioner
could appeal an adverse decision shrank to only three months, an-
nouncement of a decision to acquiesce became anticlimactic since
publication before the time for appeal had run was unlikely.21 Yet
the procedure continued. Advocates cite reasons other than tradi-
tion for the practice, including providing Service positions to tax-
payers in an orderly manner and giving courts an opportunity to
reexamine decisions which were arguably ill-advised.22 The acqui-
escence program was continued because it served the purpose of
informing taxpayers of the Commissioner's present, but not irre-
versible, view of the law.23 When the Commissioner acquiesced,
both the Service personnel and the taxpayer understood that it
was the Service's current position not to litigate the same issue
again.2 4 However, a nonacquiescence "portends continued litiga-
tion of cases involving the same facts and legal theories as were
presented in a given case. '25 Usually the Commissioner acqui-
esces in cases which hinge on the court's interpretation of the
facts. For the most part this reflects the Commissioner's "ap-
praisal of the chances of reversing the Tax Court in the face of the
appellate standard which dictates that the Tax Court's findings of
fact not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. ' 26
The Commissioner is also motivated to acquiesce in order to
settle a contested point of law. The Service feels that out-of-court
disposition of a contested issue is fostered by a large body of de-
cided cases to which the Commissioner has acquiesced and which
may be relied upon by Service personnel and taxpayers alike in
resolving similar disputes.27 The tax system would flounder and
fall from its own weight if each dispute were treated as unique and
capable of ultimate resolution only by a court. Often a case is
found that is sufficiently similar to the taxpayer's situation to pro-
collected in Dwan, Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury
Practice, 46 COLUm. L. REv. 581, 599 n.74 (1946).
21. Uretz, supra note 17, at 130-31.
22. Dwan, supra note 20, at 599.
23. Rogovin, supra note 16, at 772. There are 16 judges of the Tax Court. Since
they ordinarily sit individually, there are in reality 16 different courts and
their decisions are often hard to reconcile. E. GRIswoLD & M. GRAETZ, supra
note 8, at 61.
24. Rogovin, supra note 16, at 772.
25. Uretz, supra note 17, at 140. The former chief counsel stated that decisions as
to whether to acquiesce or not reflect two major objectives: "to handle tax
controversies fairly, efficiently, and expeditiously in order to avoid needless
litigation; and to achieve the maximum possible uniformity and consistency
of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers." Id. at 141.
26. To some extent, these acquiescences also reflect a desire to avoid unneces-
sary litigation and a willingness to accept the Tax Court determination of fac-
tual issues. Id. at 141-42.
27. Id. at 138-39.
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vide a basis for settlement. Thus, the Commissioner's acquies-
cence fills a void created by the absence of a Revenue Ruling on
point, as well as aids application of general rulings to specific fact
situations. 28 Under this rationale, the Commissioner continues to
publish acquiescence decisions.
B. How the Service Reveals its Position
The first nonacquiescence was published in the weekly Bulletin
dated December 22, 1924, and also in the Cumulative Bulletin
which followed.29 It served to both notify the successful litigant
that the Commissioner might within the year's grace period com-
mence an appeal, and other taxpayers that the Service has exer-
cised its option not to consider the instant case as a precedent in
the disposition of other similar cases. 30 Since then, in every Inter-
nal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin and in nearly every weekly issue
of the Internal Revenue Bulletin there is an announcement relat-
ing to adverse decisions of the Tax Court to which the Commis-
sioner does or does not acquiesce. 3 1 The lists often show, by
footnotes, that the acquiescence or nonacquiescence relates only
to certain issues in the case or indicates that the current position is
28. rd. at 139. The weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin announces official rulings
and procedures of the Service. Bulletin contents of a permanent nature are
consolidated semiannually into Cumulative Bulletins.
29. The following procedural note accompanied the announcement of the first
nonacquiescence:
Under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1924, relating to appeals
to the Board of Tax Appeals, a proceeding in court may be begun for
the collection of any part of a tax determined by the Commissioner to
be due but disallowed by the Board, provided that such proceeding is
commenced within one year after final decision by the Board.... In
order that taxpayers and the general public may be informed as to
whether or not the Commissioner has acquiesced in a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals disallowing a tax determined by the Commis-
sioner to be due in any case where the issues involved are other than
those purely of fact, announcement will be made in the weekly Inter-
nal Revenue Bulletin at the earliest practicable date as to whether
the Commissioner has acquiesced or has decided to cause legal pro-
ceedings to be instituted .... No decision of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals disallowing a tax determined by the Commissioner to be due
will be cited or relied upon by any officer or employee of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue as a precedent in the disposition of other cases
unless and until the Commissioner definitely announces his acquies-
cence in such decision or, if the matter is submitted to the courts,
until after final adjudication.
11-2 C.B. iv (1924).
30. The decisions as to which cases the Commissioner will accept as binding pre-
cedent also serve as a guide to the tax practitioner. Comment, supra note 14,
at 276.
31. The Commissioner is not obligatedto express either an acquiescence or non-
acquiescence. Calechman, supra note 9, at 123.
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a reversal of an earlier announcement.32 Occasionally an acquies-
cence is identified in a footnote as an "acquiescence in result
only." This indicates that the Commissioner disagrees with at
least some aspect of the Tax Court's reasoning despite the accept-
ance of the conclusion itself.33
It has been the stated policy of the Service to announce its ac-
quiescences and nonacquiescences to Tax Court decisions at the
"earliest practicable date. '34 However, the Commissioner does not
always promptly disclose the Service position. For example, the
Commissioner waited ten years before publishing a position on the
Tax Court decision in National Lead Co. v. Commissioner.35 In ad-
dition, the Commissioner does not always publish a position on
Tax Court decisions, and never publishes a position on district
court, court of appeals, or Court of Claims cases.36 Although the
Commissioner does not openly nonacquiesce in a circuit court of
appeals decision, the Service position in that regard can be readily
inferred.3 7 Notwithstanding an in-house joke to the contrary,38
32. Dwan, supra note 20, at 593.
33. Uretz, supra note 17, at 140.
34. Id. at 137.
35. 23 T.C. 988 (1955). The most important issue in the case was whether the
taxpayer was entitled to percentage depletion based upon gross income from
ilmenite obtained from a mine although none of the titanium contained in the
ilmenite concentrate was reduced to metal on a commercial basis. The Office
of Chief Counsel explained the delay as follows:
The ten-year interval between the Tax Court's decision in Na-
tional Lead in 1955 and the publication of acquiescence and nonac-
quiescence in 1965 . . . can be at least partially explained by the
above factors [necessity to revoke previous ruling, revise regulations,
or defer pending appellate proceedings]. The Government appealed
one of the issues in that case to the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
and won. The Supreme Court granted the taxpayer's petition for cer-
tiorari, and affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals, 352 U.S. 313
(1957). Our records unfortunately do not disclose what occasioned
the further delay in publication of the acquiescences and nonac-
quiescences in the four issues lost by the Commissioner,... but
presumably one or more of the issues required extensive considera-
tion prior to publication of Service position.
Letter from John H. Menzel, Director, Tax Litigation Division, Office of the
Chief Counsel, to the author (Jan. 15, 1980) (copy of letter on file with Ne-
braska Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Menzel letter]. The Commis-
sioner's decision was published in 1965-2 C.B. 6,7. See also Comment, supra
note 3, at 550 n.4.
36. New Developments, supra note 19, at 57.
37. If the court of appeals affirms the Tax Court decision and the Commissioner
then withdraws a nonacquiescence, agreement is signaled. On the other
hand, if the nonacquiescence is not withdrawn, further litigation on the issue
may be anticipated. Dwan, supra note 20, at 593.
38. A standard joke in the Service concerns "the neophyte ... employee who,
when confronted with a decision of the Supreme Court, said Tm not aware of
acquiescence by the Commissioner in that decision."' Id. at 594 n.45.
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there is, of course, no disagreement with a Supreme Court deci-
sion. There remains, however, the usual problem of defining the
scope of a particular Supreme Court decision.39
C. The Role of the Tax Court
The Tax Court was originally established as an independent
quasi-judicial executive agency 4 to provide taxpayers with an in-
dependent hearing on tax appeals. A distinction must be made be-
tween the role of the Board of Tax Appeals under the Revenue Act
of 1924 and the Tax Court's current role. Originally, the Board's
decisions were to a large extent administrative; in 1928, the First
Circuit noted in Blair v. Curran,41 that "[tihe hearing before the
Board was at that time little more than a preliminary skirmish, a
run for luck."42 The Tax Court's present status is no longer that of
an independent agency in the executive branch of government.43
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress established the Tax Court
as an Article I court which exercises legislative power. Both Con-
gress4 4 and the courts4 5 have generally recognized that it exercises
judicial, rather than administrative, functions. 46 Independent of
the-nternal Revenue Service, it has responsibility for making im-
partial determinations of law and fact following a full evidentiary
hearing.47 The Tax Court has nationwide jurisdiction 48 which indi-
cates Congress's interest in the uniform application of tax law.49
39. Supreme Court decisions in tax cases are republished in the Internal Reve-
nue Bulletin, but the lawyer's usual problem remains as to the inferences to
be drawn and application of the decision to cases which may vary slightly in
the factual circumstances. Id. at 594.
40. The Supreme Court stated that the Board of Tax Appeals is an agency, not a
court, whose purpose is to provide an "independent review" of the Commis-
sioner's decisions. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 721,
725 (1929).
41. 24 F.2d 390 (1st Cir. 1928). The decision of the Board became final if neither
side took additional court action within one year, but the parties did not ordi-
narily regard the Board decision as a final determination. Griswold, Res Judi-
cata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L J. 1320, 1323 (1937).
42. 24 F.2d at 392.
43. See LR.C. § 7441.
44. H. R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 30-31 (1927).
45. See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 121 (1926).
46. Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of Appeals
Precedents, 57 COLum. L. REv. 717 (1957).
47. I.R.C. § 7442; see also Comment, supra note 14, at 275.
48. See note 47 supra.
49. During extensive discussion on the Revenue Act of 1926, Senators King and
Norris raised the concern that when the court sat as divisions and held hear-
ings at various locations throughout the country it might lead to different an-
swers to identical questions. A procedural provision of the Act, § 90b, was
incorporated whereby every decision of the divisions would be reported to
1980] 1009
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Although tax cases may be brought in one of the ninety-odd dis-
trict courts, or in the Court of Claims, most tax cases begin in the
Tax Court.50 Appeals from the Tax Court are taken to the courts of
appeals of the ten circuits and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. Decisions of these appellate courts
are reviewed by the Supreme Court only by certiorari which is
generally granted only when a conflict in the intermediate courts
has developed.5 1 Because of this low Supreme Court proffle, the
decisions from the multiplicity of intermediate courts of appeals
have become a regrettable source of confusion with respect to in-
ternal revenue taxes.52
At one time the Tax Court, in its "self-appointed" role as na-
tional tax spokesperson, refused to be bound by the decisions of
the various courts of appeals which had appellate jurisdiction over
it.53 The Tax Court would deny binding authority to appellate
precedents while applying the doctrine of stare decisis to its own
rulings.54 It maintained that it could not fulfill its responsibility to
administer a uniform law of federal taxation if it were to follow the
diverse precedents set by the courts of appeals. Accordingly, the
Tax Court disregarded circuit court decisions that it felt were un-
sound even though it professed "due deference" to the circuit
courts' opinions. 55 In the now famous Dobson case,56 Mr. Justice
Jackson recognized the authority of the circuit court of appeals to
reverse the decision of the Tax Court only if there was no "clear-
the full court in Washington, D.C., for review prior to publication. 67 CONG.
REc. 3749-50 (1926). See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 90b, 44 Stat. 110 (1926).
50. In 1978, the Tax Court tried 1,742 cases, while the U.S. district courts and the
Court of Claims combined only handled 447. 1978 FINANCES REPORT, supra
note 4, at 198. Quantitatively, tax cases are not a particular burden. But qual-
itatively, in terms of person hours spent in deciding tax cases, they are a ma-
jor burden on the existing federal judiciary. Section of Taxation, ABA Panel
Discussion, Proposals for a New National Court of Tax Appeals and the Role
in Tax Litigation of the Court of Clains, 33 TAX LAWYER 7,8 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA Panel Discussion].
51. Thus it is not enough to litigate a point of law once, often it must be brought
to a court of competent jurisdiction two or more times. R. PAUL, supra note 7,
at 668. See note 118 infra for an extreme example where an issue was liti-
gated in six circuits.
52. Dwan, supra note 20, at 584-85.
53. Note, Collateral Estoppel: Loosening the Mutuality Rule in Tax Litigation, 73
MVcH. L. REV. 604, 615 (1975).
54. Each court of appeals has limited territorial jurisdiction and on remand the
Tax Court must regard the rule of decision laid down on appeal as the law of
the case. The Tax Court has, nevertheless, "consistently reserved and fre-
quently exercised the power to adhere to its position and reject the appellate
court precedent." Comment, supra note 46, at 718-19.
55. Note, supra note 15, at 411.




cut" question of law.57
In a later case, Lawrence v. Commissioner,5 8 the Tax Court
maintained that its nation-wide jurisdiction compelled the applica-
tion of its own decision on a particular issue without constraint by
the diverse precedents of the courts of appeals.59 The court rea-
soned that its duty was to apply tax law equally to all taxpayers,
regardless of their residence or the Commissioner's nonacquies-
cence policy. Although Lawrence was overruled by the Ninth Cir-
cuit,60 the Tax Court remained steadfast in its independent stance,
thus incurring frequent criticism by the courts of appeals. 61 Its
contrariness was to no avail, for if the taxpayer was willing to pur-
sue an appeal, the court of appeals rule would again prevail. 62 The
only result was needless litigation and the attendant judicial ineffi-
ciency.
Finally, the Tax Court gave in. In Golsen v. Commissioner,63
the Tax Court reexamined Lawrence and agreed to follow the deci-
sion of the particular court of appeals to which appeal would lay
when the precedent was "squarely on point."6 4 The Tax Court es-
tablished the rule that it would defer to the court of appeals while
asserting its own reasons for disagreeing. The Commissioner
could, however, continue to litigate the issue. If a conflict devel-
oped, the Commissioner would then seek certiorari to the
Supreme Court and thereby attain a final determination of the is-
sue.65
The Tax Court has evidenced a concern over the "tentative au-
thority of any construction of the taxing statutes which has not re-
ceived Supreme Court approval." 66 Although the Tax Court
accepts a large number of adverse decisions, rulings of a court of
appeals are not regarded as necessarily determinative on the is-
sue.67 In spite of concurrences by several other circuits, court of
appeals precedents have been overruled and the Tax Court's posi-
57. Id. at 502. In that case the Supreme Court also denominated the Tax Court as
"the well-nigh infallible tax-interpreting body," motivated in part at least by
the Supreme Court's desire to reduce its own involvement in tax matters. R.
PAUL, supra note 7, at 664.
58. 27 T.C. 713 (1957).
59. Id. at 718.
60. Lawrence v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
61. Note, supra note 15, at 412.
62. Note, supra note 53, at 615.
63. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, Golsen v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
64. 54 T.C. at 757.
65. Note, supra note 15, at 414.
66. Comment, supra note 46, at 720.
67. When the applicable court of appeals decision is an affirmance in open court
without opinion, and therefore having no precedential value, the Tax Court is
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tion upheld when the Supreme Court decided to review the is-
sue.68 The Commissioner's recognition of this possibility lends
support to the nonacquiescence policy.6 9
The factors that the Tax Court considers in striving for a uni-
form tax policy are not necessarily the same as those of the Com-
missioner. The Commissioner considers ease of administration,
likelihood of continued litigation, and revenue implications.7 0
Meanwhile, the Tax Court pursues its perceived duty of uniformly
administering the revenue laws, in recognition of its Congres-
sionally mandated national jurisdiction and the relatively infre-
quent review of tax cases by the Supreme Court.71
D. How a Taxpayer "Nonacquiesces"
When the Commissioner assesses a deficiency, the contesting
taxpayer may either refuse to pay and petition the Tax Court for
review,7 2 or file a claim in a federal district court 73 or the Court of
Claims.74 In order to bypass the Tax Court, the taxpayer must first
pay the contested deficiency and then file a claim for refund with
the Service within two years of payment. If the claim is denied or
no action is taken by the Service within six months, the taxpayer
may sue for a refund in either a United States district court or the
Court of Claims.75
The present civil tax appellate system has been criticized and
debated for more than forty years.7 6 Tax Court decisions may be
appealed by right to the circuit court in the circuit of the taxpayer's
legal residence when the petition was filed.77 Circuit court and
Court of Claims decisions are appealable only to the Supreme
Court itself. Thus, the Tax Court is compelled to function under
the guidance of many masters, including the ten circuit courts of
appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the
not bound by the Goisen rule of uniformity. See Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 548 (1975).
68. Comment, supra note 46, at 720.
69. Id.
70. The standards by which an adverse decision is tested by the Service include
determining whether acquiescence is likely to be acceptable to most taxpay-
ers thus ending litigation on the issue, and whether the revenue loss can be
tolerated. Id. at 721 n.45.
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. §§ 7441-7487. Petition must be filed within 90 days after notice of defi-
ciency is mailed. I.I.C. § 6213(a).
73. I.R.C. § 7422; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1976).
74. I.R.C. § 7422; 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
75. I.R.C. § 6532.
76. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
77. LR.C. § 7482(a).
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Supreme Court.78 And though finality can only come with a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court, it rarely reviews a tax decision in the
absence of a conflict between circuits.7 9
Since the average taxpayer cannot afford to litigate a tax mat-
ter, he must be content with knowing with as much certainty as
possible what the law is. The great majority of taxpayers merely
want to follow the law. By providing taxpayers the answers to
questions of law, both the taxpayer and the Service can avoid the
litigation that neither desires. Accordingly, one of the goals of tax
administration should be certainty.8 0
The nonacquiescence policy is most onerous on the small tax-
payer who must litigate to take advantage of a precedent which the
Commissioner opts to ignore. Where the stakes are larger, it may
be worth the time and expense to litigate. But this result is anom-
alous since the taxpayer is forced to go to court to hear again what
the court has said in an earlier case.81 The time and expense in-
volved may cause the small taxpayer to choose not to litigate an
issue which a wealthier taxpayer with a large claim may be able to
challenge. This results in one set of rules, established by the Com-
missioner, being applicable to small taxpayers while another set,
mandated by the courts, is available to large taxpayers. 82 As such,
the nonacquiescence program violates two principles of taxation-
uniformity and progression.
However, the Tax Court has implemented a simplified proce-
dure for disputes which do not exceed $5,000 in any tax year.83
Under the Small Tax Case procedure, taxpayers may present their
case before a special trial judge in informal hearings. It has the
advantage in that a knowledge of courtroom proceedings is not re-
quired and thus an inexpensive forum is provided for the tax-
payer.84 However, neither the taxpayer nor the government may
appeal from decisions in such cases. 8 5 In this manner, the unequal
burden of the nonacquiescence policy on smaller taxpayers is
somewhat lessened.
The courts' interpretation of The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act of 1976 also adversely affects the small taxpayer.8 6 The
78. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH.
U. L.Q. 399, 416 (1940).
79. Id. This is discussed in further depth in the section of this article entitled,
"Role of the Supreme Court," § lI-D of text infra.
80. New Developments, supra note 19, at 57.
81. Comment, supra note 14, at 278.
82. See generally, EISENSTEIN, IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATioN 12 (1961).
83. I.R.C. § 7463.
84. 1978 FINANCES REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
85. Id., 1978 IRS REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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district courts have reached divergent conclusions. A Montana
district court allowed attorney's fees to a tax refund plaintiff and
specifically held that the statute permitted award without regard
to which party initiated the action.87 On the other hand, other
courts have held that an award of fees could not be made unless
the government was the plaintiff and bad faith or harassment was
established.88 The majority of the district courts are now following
the Tax Court's decision in Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner,89
which denied attorney's fees to taxpayers in connection with re-
fund litigation.90 In 1978 the Court of Claims also followed Key Bu-
ick and held that attorney's fees could not be awarded because the
law did not apply to actions brought against the government. 91
However, there are some cases which have awarded attorney's
fees when there is the appearance that the government's action
materially contributed to their incurrence. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the government's counterclaim in con-
nection with a taxpayer-initiated refund suit was an action brought
by the United States and remanded the case to determine whether
the other requirements were met for payment of attorney's fees.92
In a recent district court case, the taxpayer won nearly $9,000 in
attorney's fees. The court held that the government had acted in
bad faith when it charged a bookkeeper with failure to pay FICA
and income tax withholdings. The Justice Department Tax Divi-
sion attorney had refused to drop the case and, with unusual can-
dor, stated that the government wanted to make sure the
bookkeeper would testify against the company president and sole
stockholder, who was their real target. This was enough to con-
vince Judge Newcomer of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania that the government had acted in bad
faith.93
87. Levno v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont. 1977).
88. Engel v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Kline v. United
States, 429 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (D. Md. 1977).
89. 68 T.C. 178 (1977). In Key Buick the court observed that The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), provides that at-
torney's fees may be allowed as part of the costs in "any civil action or pro-
ceeding, by or on behalf of the United States," and therefore reimbursement
is not available in cases appealed to the Supreme Court since those cases are
never initiated by the government. The court went on to say it could not
award attorney's fees because there was no statutory authority for such an
award. 68 T.C. at 179.
90. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. United States, 78-1 U.S.T.C. 9323, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1070
(W.D. Tex. 1978).
91. Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
92. Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978).
93. On counsel's advice, the bookkeeper paid $10 of the $86,858 assessed and then
filed for a refund with the Service. The district director at Philadelphia de-
nied the request. Upon receipt of the denial, the taxpayer flied suit for refund
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It remains to be seen whether a sufficiently strong case can be
made for the award of attorney's fees merely because the Commis-
sioner's nonacquiescence was, in itself, the cause of the unneces-
sary suit and where the decision, because of the jurisdiction
involved, was a foregone conclusion. While the Tax Court has no
jurisdiction to award costs, 94 it is especially in this forum that the
taxpayer should be reimbursed for legal expenses when the Tax
Court merely reaffirms its earlier decision, to which the Commis-
sioner had not acquiesced. When the Commissioner announces
nonacquiescence to a Tax Court decision it forces the taxpayer to
initiate an unnecessary suit. Many times the Commissioner is mo-
tivated by economic considerations: if the Service wins, the tax
coffers may be greatly enriched. Justice and a sense of fair play
dictate that if the court affirms its decision in favor of the taxpayer,
representational fees should be reimbursed.
IlI. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Applicability of Stare Decisis
In view of the immense effort that goes into the compilation of
tax services, reports, digests, indices, summaries, guides, and con-
solidations, both governmental and private, one would necessarily
conclude that there must be a sound basis of underlying principle
and case law to rely on to support one's case.95 But, "a small
amount of tunneling soon convinces the observer... that the bed-
in the U.S. District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania. The government an-
swered that claim with a counterclaim for the balance of the assessment,
thereby making the bookkeeper eligible for attorney's fees under The Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, if successful in the suit. Prior to
trial, the government settled its claim with the company president for $55,700,
but continued to pursue the bookkeeper. Under oath the government attor-
ney denied having made the statements alleged by the bookkeeper's attor-
ney, but the jury and Judge Newcomer believed the taxpayer's story and held
that the government counterclaim had been "instituted in bad faith," putting
the taxpayer to the expense of defending against litigation which should not
have been required. Bryant v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
94. Pub. L. No. 94-559 added the provision for attorney's fees to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in
a section that begins: "[tihe jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters con-
ferred on the district courts .... ." The Tax Court therefore concluded that
the provision was inapplicable to cases in that forum. Key Buick Co. v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 178, 179 (1977). Furthermore, taxpayers represented in Tax
Court by non-attorneys would, arguably, not incur "attorney's fees." Non-
attorneys can practice before the Tax Court after qualification via examina-
tion but the number qualifying has been modest. In the 1977 annual exami-
nation three out of forty applicants passed; in 1978 there were thirty-seven
applicants and again three were successful. Telephone interview with Ms.
Clark, Admissions Clerk U.S. Tax Court (Dec. 21, 1979).
95. Unlike most other fields of law, history does not repeat itself in the taxation
area. While tomes of case law exist, every new case is reviewed and decided
1980] 1015
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
rock is about as solid as Swiss cheese."96
The doctrine of stare decisis holds that a court's decision as to a
matter of law is binding on that court and all courts subject to its
jurisdiction whenever the same question reappears 97 in a subse-
quent action between different parties.98 However, in tax matters,
one who relies on the doctrine of stare decisis is likely to be disap-
pointed.99 Under the current procedures, taxpayers whose circum-
stances are in all other respects identical may be required by the
courts to pay different amounts of tax solely because they are resi-
dents of different jurisdictions.100
Early on, the Supreme Court found the principle of finality of
judgment, as expressed in the doctrine of collateral estoppel, to be
applicable in federal tax cases, 101 but limited the doctrine to those
cases where all operative facts were identical. 0 2 Collateral estop-
pel seeks to conserve judicial energy, promote confidence in the
judicial system, avoid unnecessary litigant expenses, and mini-
mize inconsistent results.10 3 Offsetting these benefits are the dan-
ger of perpetuating error, the need for flexibility, and
considerations of fairness. 10 4 The collateral estoppel doctrine has
been criticized as allowing one taxpayer to escape taxation follow-
ing an "erroneous" court decision, while others similarly situated
are unable to take advantage of the same decision. 0 5




98. Where a question of law is actually litigated and determined, that determina-
tion is ordinarily conclusive as to subsequent actions where the circum-
stances are similar but one or more parties are new. The Restatement
asserts that:
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, where a court has in one case
decided a question of law it will in subsequent cases in which the
same question of law arises ordinarily decide it in the same way. The
doctrine is not rigidly applied, and a court will sometimes overrule its
prior decisions.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, § 70, Comment (a), at 319 (1942).
99. When it comes to tax law, precedent "has been kicked in the pants and stare
decisis writhes again." Marcosson, supra note 95, at 137. Consultation of the
various resources available to the taxpayer and the taxpayer's counselor is
unlikely to provide a dependable answer to even a question closely parallel-
ing one previously litigated. Id.
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
101. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in
federal tax cases. Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933).
102. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
103. Note, supra note 53, at 604-05.
104. Id. at 605.
105. deY. Manning, The Application of the Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Gov-
ernment in Federal Tax Cases, 30 N.C. L. REV. 356, 359 (1952).
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The doctrine of res judicata in tax cases, as in law generally,
rests on a rule of public policy designed to give judgments finality
in the interest of achieving an end to litigation, and requires that
an issue once litigated by a court of competent jurisdiction remain
settled. 0 6 In 1948, the Supreme Court sharply limited the availa-
bility of defenses based on finality of judgment and held that a
prior judgment is res judicata only in "a subsequent proceeding
involving the same claim and the same tax year." 0 7 Each new tax
year gives rise to a different cause of action.108
All three--collateral estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis-
are based on considerations of judicial economy and a policy of
favoring certainty in legal relations. 109 Interpreting tax statutes is
a function in which the tendency to apply the doctrine of stare de-
cisis is unusually strong." 0 Once the Commissioner has had one
full and fair opportunity to press a claim, and loses in a court of
law, the consideration of judicial economy must be weighed heav-
ily when other cases arise on the same issue.' In a 1972 district
court case1 1 2 it was held that requiring the relitigation of an issue
results "in a significant waste of time, expenses, and man-
power."" 3 In 1957, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, summarized the atti-
tude toward precedent, by stating-that it "underlies the whole
system of our case law.""n 4 When a tribunal permits a party to
106. See generally Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933).
107. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
108. 10 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60.25, at 90 (rev. ed.
1976). Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1942).
109. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, §§ 68-70 (1942). See also Note, Collateral
Estoppel in Tax Fraud Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1965).
110. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINIs-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8,77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 466 (1941).
111. To insist that each case, no matter how similar to one previously decided,
should be litigated is a redundancy our legal system can ill afford. Note,
supra note 53, at 619.
112. Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
113. The case involved a partnership relationship which had been determined in
"a court of competent jurisdiction" after a "full and fair opportunity to litigate
the partnership issue .... This instant suit involves the identical issue, the
identical operative facts, and the identical time period." Id. at 1210.
114. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion concurring in result, stated:
Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract categories. They do
not fall from the sky; nor are they pulled out of it. They have a spe-
cific juridical origin and etiology. They derive meaning and content
from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the purposes
they were designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a live tree
to its roots .... 'If a precedent involving a black horse is applied to a
case involving a white horse, we are not excited. If it were an ele-
phant or an animalferae naturae or a chose in action, then we would
venture into thought .... ' Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Vari-
eties in Constitutional Interpretation, 36.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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make whatever showing it will on the merits of an issue and then
adheres to its previously rendered decision on substantially the
same point of law, it has invoked the doctrine of stare decisis in the
interest of judicial consistency. 115
Ordinarily, stare decisis is only a principle of policy and re-
quires a series of precedents for its application. The Service
claims that, as a rule of thumb, it will conform to a judicial inter-
pretation if faced with two or more adverse decisions,116 but the
Service surrendered to insurance companies in Revenue Ruling
72-84 only after losing five decisions in court.117 The "dealers re-
serve" issue was litigated in the courts of six circuits before being
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1959.118
Prior tax decisions are regarded as controlling only when the
operative facts are closely comparable. 119 To quote the Supreme
Court: "where the facts are not the same a court is free to make an
independent examination of legal matters at issue.. . . [I] f consis-
tency in decision is considered just and desirable, reliance can be
placed on the ordinary rule of stare decisis."'20 Although the doc-
115. Branscomb, Collateral Estoppel in Tax Cases: Static and Separable Facts, 37
TEX. L. REV. 584, 595-96 (1959).
116. Uretz, supra note 17, at 144; Comment, supra note 14, at 278; see also ABA
Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 28.
117. Rev. Rul. 72-84, 1972-1 C.B. 216.
118. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959). The "dealer's reserve" issue
concerned accrual basis taxpayers engaged in the sales of commercial install-
ment paper to finance companies. The financial companies paid a portion in
cash and retained a percentage which they credited on their books to the
taxpayers' reserve accounts for the purpose of securing performance. The
question presented was whether the amounts placed in the reserve accounts
were accrued income to the taxpayers in the year of the sale of the install-
ment paper. The Commissioner contended that it was and the Tax Court sus-
tained the Commissioner. On review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Hansen v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1958), and the Eighth
Circuit, Glover v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1958), reversed, while
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in Baird v. Commis-
sioner, 256 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1958). On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and reversed
the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, holding that the
amounts on reserve constituted income to the taxpayers in the year credited
to their accounts. The conflict had previously developed in three additional
circuits. Compare Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1958)
(sustained the Commissioner's position) with Johnson v. Commissioner, 233
F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1956) (sustaining taxpayer's position), Texas Trailercoach,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958) (same) and West Pontiac,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1958) (same).
119. Commissioner v. Jergens, 127 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1942).
120. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948). A prior determination of
the Tax Court with respect to one of several similar licensing agreements was
held not to preclude consideration of the question with respect to royalties
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trine of stare decisis was once highly respected, it has become sig-
nificantly weaker in modern times. However, the doctrine is still a
salutary one, and one which should be adhered to in the absence of
overriding considerations. 121 As a principle of policy, the "law of
the case" should not prevent a court from overriding a prior hold-
ing when convinced that it is erroneous.122 Stare decisis, like res
judicata, is a rule which forecloses and shuts out truth and can
only be justified by its compensating advantages, such as relief
from redundant litigation.123
Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized that stare decisis has long
suffered in its application to tax law by stating in the majority
opinion in Helvering v. Hallock:124
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It
represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psycho-
logic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a princi-
ple of policy and not a mechanical formula ....
... We do not mean to imply that the inevitably empiric process of
construing tax legislation should give rise to an estoppel against the re-
sponsible exercise of the judicial process. 12 5
The principle of stare decisis has been of secondary importance
to collateral estoppel in tax litigation, primarily because of the al-
leged predominancy of questions of fact in repetitious litigation of
tax problems of the same or similarly situated taxpayers. 126 Stare
decisis addresses only the precedential value given to decisions of
law.12 7 If the record in the second case is substantially different,
the court will reconsider the question and, if appropriate, reach a
contrary decision. 2 8 Furthermore, each case must be decided
upon its own record and precedents may be distinguished on their
facts. While overruling a 1930 decision,129 the Supreme Court
stated that it did not consider itself bound by prior decisions in the
tax area.1 3 0 However, the trial courts must follow the decisions of
under other agreements or with respect to royalties for other tax years under
the same agreement. Id.
121. 10 J. MERTENS, supra note 108, § 60.21.
122. Id.
123. Griswold, supra note 41, at 1355.
124. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
125. Id. at 119.
126. Branscomb, supra note 115, at 585.
127. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
128. Dwan, supra note 20, at 590.
129. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled by Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1919).
130. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). The Court, in overrul-
ing May v. Heiner, noted that the decision had been repudiated, at the re-
quest of the Treasury, by a joint resolution of Congress. This resolution did
not purport, and was not construed by the Supreme Court, to operate retroac-
tively. The instant case involved a 1924 irrevocable trust. May v. Heiner held
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courts of higher authority.13 1 In a 1950 Tax Court memorandum
decision, 132 the Tax Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis
was a compelling reason for following an earlier Tax Court deci-
sion.133 However, the Commissioner, supported by a Supreme
Court decision, does not consider a decision binding in which it
lost and was denied certiorari 34 because too many requests are
filed to expect a detailed review of each by the Court. 3 5
There are many factors which produce uncertainty as to ques-
tions of law in income tax matters which the doctrine of stare deci-
sis should operate to minimize. Uncertainty will nevertheless
remain, due to unforeseeable changes in federal statutes and
treasury regulations and the superseding Supreme Court deci-
that the corpus of a trust transfer need not be included in a settlor's estate,
even though a life interest in the income has been retained. The majority
opinion, expressing the views of five of the justices, held that May v. Heiner
could not be granted "the sanctuary of stare decisis due to various factors,"
and reversed both the Tax Court and the court of appeals decisions which
had supported the taxpayer. Id. at 648. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on
the ground that May v. Heiner should not be overruled out of respect owed by
the Court to a series of long-standing unanimous decisions and the expressed
will of Congress that its resolution not be given retroactive effect. Id. at 667
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
131. Stacy Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956). In a strongly
worded per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit noted that two other circuits
had agreed with its earlier decision which reversed the Tax Court and ad-
dressed the Tax Court's failure to adhere to that precedent in a second case.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the later case was identical "for all practical
purposes" and the Tax Court itself had stated that "the precise question" was
again presented, but that "not being convinced that the position of the tax
court [in the first case] was incorrectly taken, the tax court respectfully de-
clines to follow the contrary view." Id. The Sixth Circuit opinion continued:
The situation developed in these cases requires the expression of our
considered opinion that the Tax Court of the United States is not
lawfully privileged to disregard... an opinion of the court of appeals
for that circuit.
The desire of the Tax Court to establish ... a uniform rule does
not empower it to disregard the decisions of its several reviewing
courts of appeals.... Until the Supreme Court reverses... ,that
rule must be followed....
Id.
132. J. Simpson Dean, T.C.M. (P-H) T 50,075 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Dean v. Com-
missioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951).
133. T.C.M. (P-H) at 50,225, affirming Paulina duPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947).
134. The Supreme Court, supporting this attitude, stated that "the refusal of an
application for this extraordinary writ [of certiorari] is in no case equivalent
to an affirmance of the decree that is sought to be reviewed." Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916).
135. Nearly 5,000 requests for certiorari are filed annually with the Court. Each
year the Court decides to hear fewer than 200. B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN 2 (1979).
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sions.13 6 The Commissioner's role in the nonacquiescence pro-
gram runs counter to the legal principle of stare decisis and forces
a taxpayer to litigate in court to overcome the Commissioner's
nonacquiescence to a decision which supports his claim.137 A tax-
payer's right to rely on precedent and assert the law of the case
should be assured once the issue has been fully and fairly litigated
in a court of competent jurisdiction. Finality of judgment would
not only avoid unnecessary litigation expenses in redundant cases
but would free the crowded court calendars for suits of initial im-
pression, which in tax law are myriad.
B. The Commissioner's Role
The Internal Revenue Service is charged with the responsibility
for administering and enforcing the taxing power of the United
States Government.138 The top legal officer for the Service is the
Chief Counsel whose office "employs over 900 attorneys, making
it-next to the Department of Justice-the largest law firm in the
nation."'1 39 The Office of Chief Counsel represents the Commis-
sioner in all actions brought in the Tax Court.140 In addition, it has
jurisdiction over the acquiescence program.
The acquiescence program is an integral part of the Service's
plan for uniformity and consistency in its dealings with taxpay-
ers;141 Service personnel are obliged to follow outstanding nonac-
quiescences and acquiescences in disposing of other cases.142
While the Commissioner must follow the decision of the Supreme
Court, the nonacquiescence program asserts the authority to ig-
136. Note, Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases, 35
IOWA L. REv. 700, 712 (1950).
137. Comment, supra note 14, at 277.
138. In the enforcement and administration of these acts the Commissioner is au-
thorized to prescribe and publish "all needful rules and regulations." I.R.C.
§ 7805(a). Regulations issued under this authority are ordinarily given sub-
stantial weight by the courts. E. GRiswoLD & M. GRAETZ, supra note 8, at 46.
139. 1978 IRS REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
140. The Service disposed of a total of 17,318 general litigation cases in fiscal year
1978. Of these, 11,524 went to trial and the remainder were settled out-of-
court. On September 30, 1978, the end of fiscal year 1978, a total of 23,167 Tax
Court cases were pending, representing approximately $3.3 billion in con-
tested taxes and penalties and $0.3 billion in claimed overpayments. Figures
include small tax claim procedure cases. 1978 IRS REPORT, supra note 2, at 3,
7, 11.
141. The Commissioner's point is that federal courts which, unlike the Tax Court,
have limited geographical jurisdiction may take a different position on a simi-
lar issue of law. The Service is unwilling to create within a single region of
the country a tax haven when the courts in that area have decided cases ad-
versely to the Commissioner. Id. at 279.
142. Uretz, supra note 17, at 139.
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nore the interpretations of law of other courts.143 Except as to the
party involved in the immediate litigation, the Commissioner con-
tinues to assess taxes based on Service interpretations, notwith-
standing contrary interpretations of the Tax Court and courts of
appeals. 144 In effect, this policy empowers the Commissioner to
decide which cases to accept as binding precedents and which to
reject.145 Although the Commissioner does not announce an ac-
quiescence or nonacquiescence to United States district court,
Court of Claims, or court of appeals decisions, this does not mean
that they are accepted as binding precedents. 4 6
The Office of Chief Counsel has justified the practice of the ac-
quiescence program on the grounds of the requirement to achieve
uniformity and consistency in dealing with taxpayers. 147 Unlike
the Tax Court, the federal courts, which have limited geographical
jurisdiction, may take different positions on a similar issue of law.
The Service is unwilling to create a tax haven within a single re-
gion of the country when the courts in that area have decided
cases adversely to the Commissioner.14 Proponents further as-
sert that since only the Supreme Court can bring finality in tax
controversies, the Service should be bound by nothing less.149
Certainty, to the extent attainable, is a desirable objective in
tax law.'5 0 But the nonacquiescence program cannot be justified
on promises of certainty because when the effect of a decision is to
reduce taxes, the issue would never arise again in the courts if the
Commissioner simply acquiesced.15 1
Mutuality might be legitimately advanced as a justification for
the nonacquiescence program because the Service would be
bound by a legal ruling while the taxpayers would not.152 An argu-
ment advanced by the Second Circuit for retention of the require-
143. Comment, supra note 14, at 276. With limited Supreme Court review of tax
cases available, the Commissioner feels compelled to nonacquiesce when a
decision has a substantial effect on revenue. Of course the nonacquiescence
has only a nominal and temporary effect. Once the case gets to the court with
which the Commissioner has had a difference of opinion, the burden shifts
from the taxpayer to the government. Nonacquiescence, obviously, carries
little weight with the court whose wisdom has been questioned. Id.
144. Comment, supra note 3, at 550.
145. Comment, supra note 14, at 276.
146. The publication of opinions of these courts as a "Court Decision" in the Inter-
nal Revenue Bulletin is tantamount to acquiescence. Id.
147. Id. at 279.
148. Id.
149. With limited Supreme Court review of tax cases available, the Commissioner
feels compelled to nonacquiesce when a decision has a substantial effect on
revenue. Id.
150. R. PAuL, supra note 7, at 664.
151. Comment, supra note 3, at 559.
152. Id. at 562.
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ment of mutality is the need to foster the Commissioner's
obligation to relitigate issues which the Commissioner feels have
been incorrectly decided.153 However, the application of the
mutality rule cannot be explained by policy considerations unique
to tax litigation since the factors which have led to its abolition in
other areas apply to tax matters with equal force.15 4 A mandatory
acquiescence rule would eliminate the mutuality requirement, yet
the result could be overcome by the Commissioner. If a
mandatory acquiescence rule has the effect of significantly reduc-
ing revenues, the Commissioner could and should, after losing an
appeal or being denied certiorari, ask Congress to rewrite the
law. 5 5 Whether or not the law is changed, planning and certainty
would be furthered and a national uniformity consistent with the
newly expressed Congressional intent would result.
The Commissioner prefers not to permit taxpayers to rely upon
acquiescences. Former Chief Counsel Uretz stated that one rea-
son for this position is that otherwise acceptable decisions may
contain "analytical nuances and shadings" which the Service
would not have stated in the same way.5 6 "Disagreement over the
meaning of an acquiescence.., would be expanded to an intolera-
ble degree were acquiescences to be treated as firm bedrock for
tax planning as are regulations and rulings," Uretz added.15 7 Un-
like regulations, rulings, and determination letters, a published ac-
quiescence is not intended to be relied upon by taxpayers in tax
planning.5 8 Service personnel must apply the ruling when it
153. Stern & Stern Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1959). The
Second Circuit was apparently responding to the mounting sentiment for
abandonment of the requirement of mutuality where the issues are identical.
In Divine v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit noted the "formidable policy
justifications for sanctioning the Commissioner's relitigation in different cir-
cuits of legally identical tax issues," which are factually different only as to
the taxpayer involved. The court continued: "the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service has on many occasions taken the position.., that a
Court of Appeals decision with which he disagrees has no binding effect on
the Service's policies in other circuits." 500 F.2d 1041, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1974).
154. Note, supra note 53, at 618.
155. Commissioner Kurtz noted that recourse to Congress may not always be a
satisfactory way to solve issues. However, the Commissioner noted that it
does act as a safety valve and in some cases would result in a resolution six or
eight years sooner than merely relying on further litigation in the courts.
ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 14.
156. Uretz, supra note 17, at 136.
157. Id.
158. Even publication of an acquiescence or nonacquiescence is accompanied by a
disclaimer on reliance:
This principle is no more than a reflection of the fact that Congress,
not the Commissioner, prescribes the tax laws. The Commissioner's
rulings have only such force as Congress chooses to give them, and
Congress has not given them the force of law. Consequently it would
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works to a taxpayer's disadvantage. Yet, a taxpayer can not assert
an acquiescence since it can be withdrawn at any time. When re-
quired, the Commissioner may use the Tax Court case as the
source for a Revenue Ruling in which the Service will reflect its
own analysis and interpretation of the statutes. 5 9
Another complaint is that the Commissioner seems to ignore
judicial construction of statutes and nonacquiesces to maximize
revenue. 160 The Commissioner is under Congressional and execu-
tive pressure to maintain efficient collections of taxes. In its An-
nual Report,16 ' the Service compares the results for the current
year to the previous year's performance. In this environment, the
Commissioner's concern with maximization of tax collections
when interpreting an ambiguous statute is not surprising.162 The
principle which states that whenever there is doubt as to the impo-
sition of a tax, "all doubts should be resolved in favor of the tax-
payer... 163 has long since been discarded. The argument used
to be that tax statutes should be strictly construed because the
government had its chance to write the law as it wished, and any
other interpretation would be likely to injure taxpayers who relied
upon the literal meaning.164 More recently it has been asserted
that the primary duty of the Commisssioner is to collect reve-
nue.165 The Attorney General ruled early on that the Commis-
sioner should adopt the construction most favorable to the
government. 6 6 Under such guidance, the Commissioner's role is
more closely analogous to that of a contestant than that of a impar-
appear that the Commissioner's acquiescence in an erroneous deci-
sion, published as a ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the United
States from collecting a tax otherwise lawfully due.
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965).
159. Uretz, supra note 17, at 136.
160. Comment, supra note 3, at 554; New Developments, supra note 19, at 58; see
also Comment, supra note 14, at 280. As a tax-gathering agency, the Service
has a natural tendency to resolve any controversy in favor of the government
and at the expense of the taxpayer. There is also a danger that it might some-
times overstep the bounds of the administrative discretion given by Con-
gress. The record indicates that the Service, on occasion, has been less than
judicial in its treatment of taxpayers. R. PAu-, supra note 7, at 665-67.
161. E.g., 1978 IRS REPORT, supra note 2.
162. The Service is one of the few governmental bodies whose success is gauged
by the ratio of revenue earned to cost incurred. When income is up and cost
is down, the management is considered efficient. New Developments, supra
note 19, at 58.
163. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938). See generally May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238, 245 (1930); United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923);
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
164. Comment, Tax Statutes-The Role of Stare Decisis in Determining "Legisla-
tive Inten4 " 49 MIcH. L. REv. 407 (1951).
165. Cole, From Treasury Decision to Judicial Decision, 12 TAXES 531, 532 (1934).
166. 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 246 (1885).
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tial arbiter.167 In 1962, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that this philos-
ophy-that the Commissioner has to protect the revenue-leads to
a "strong arm"16 8 course of action which runs counter to the pur-
pose which is generally reflected by Congress in the income tax
laws.
Former Chief Counsel Hauser stated that in deciding whether
to acquiesce, the Service considers uniformity, certainty, and the
effect on the revenue. 16 9 The Service position on protecting the
revenue was presented differently in an address by then-Commis-
sioner Cohen. He stated that the citizen has a right to expect the
government to administer the law on the merits, not on revenue
considerations: "the revenue is protected only when we ascertain
and apply the true meaning of the statute."'170 Cohen's position re-
sponds to the taxpayer complaint that the Commissioner is unfair
to taxpayers when the nonacquiescence is based solely on a goal of
maximizing revenue. Empirical evidence does not indicate that
the policy announcement has had any meritorious effect on the
program.17 1 These disclaimers by the Service are not reflected in
the sharp increase in the number of published nonacquiescences.
After acquiescing in four-fifths of the Tax Court decisions for many
years, the ratio dropped to less than one in two in 1978.172 It is
evident that each decision can have a far-reaching effect.'7 3
The taxpayer may be confronted with the choice either of pay-
ing the assessed taxes or requesting a court to rule again on a point
of law it has already decided.174
Unnecessary costs and congestion. . . are the result of a situation which,
actually, places the Commissioner above any court in the land. It is hardly
possible to reconcile this with our democratic and republican form of gov-
ernment. The Commissioner is judge and prosecutor at the same time,
something which is completely alien to our Constitution.17
5
167. The Service is authorized to interpret the law and yet is constrained by the
mandate that it be done with maximization of revenue as the controlling cri-
terion. Accordingly, the Commissioner cannot be expected to perform this
task with the utmost impartiality. Cole, supra note 165, at 532.
168. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 303 (5th Cir. 1962). In Jones, the Com-
missioner sought review by the Fifth Circuit "only to protect revenue in the
event the individual taxpayers... are held not to be taxable on the net pro-
ceeds of a judgment of the United States Court of Claims." Id. at 293.
169. Comment, supra note 3, at 559.
170. Cohen, The New Commissioner Reports, 17 TAx ExEcuTvE 277, 277-78 (1965).
171. See table at note 3 supra.
172. Id.
173. Although the instant case may involve only one taxpayer, the decision may
affect millions of taxpayers. Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048-49
(2d Cir. 1974).
174. See notes 80-81 & accompanying text supra.
175. Herzberg, Blueprint of a Fair Tax Administration, 41 TAXEs 161, 163 (1963).
In this article Herzberg advocated the formation of a Court of Tax Appeals to
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Casting the Commissioner in an adversary role may further the
exploration of issues for judicial determination. But once that de-
termination is made, the Commissioner's nonacquiescence and
continued enforcement of the Service construction may be unfair
to taxpayers and deny courts the traditional respect accorded
them as final impartial arbiters.17 6 The decision to appeal requires
sound and informed professional judgment. When frivolous ap-
peals are initiated by the government, rather than an individual
taxpayer, the situation is even less desirable. 7 7
C. Reconsideration and Retroactivity
Courts are frequently criticized in tax matters because they
create uncertainty when they change their minds.178 Like the
courts, the Commissioner has also been chastised for reversing a
previous position. 7 9 However, a change of mind cannot be suc-
cessfully challenged unless the discretion vested in the Commis-
sioner has been abused.180 Reliance on published acquiescences is
not encouraged since the Commissioner reserves the right to with-
draw a published acquiescence.' 8 1 Similarly, taxpayers are
warned to exercise caution in relying on Service rulings. Pub-
lished rulings and acquiescences may be revoked and given effect
retroactively, even after a taxpayer has relied upon them.182 In ad-
dition, private rulings issued to one taxpayer may not necessarily
be applied to another. 83
Retroactive application of a new interpretation is often objec-
tionable, and is particularly suspect when the change radically de-
parts from traditional interpretations. For example, Mr. Justice
Roberts, dissenting in Helvering v. Hallock, 84 pointed out that the
rule overturned in that case had been uniformly followed in over
offset the "effects of procedures that hamper a fair administration of our tax
laws. .. ." Id. at 164.
176. New Developments, supra note 19, at 58.
177. Dwan, supra note 20, at 598.
178. While courts are criticized on many fronts for "judicial legislation" which
goes beyond the letter of the law, and for pursuing "too eagerly" those who
would seek to avoid taxes, they too often "commit what many regard as the
unforgivable sin of changing their minds." R. PAUL, supra note 7, at 663.
179. Uretz, supra note 17, at 113; Comment, supra note 14, at 277. See also
Calechman, supra note 9; New Developments, supra note 19, at 57.
180. Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 185 (1957).
181. New Developments, supra note 19, at 57.
182. Calechman, supra note 9, at 123; Herzberg, supra note 175, at 162; Uretz,
supra note 17, at 133.
183. Calechman, supra note 9, at 122.
184. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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fifty cases. 18 5 The question of retroactive revocation of an acquies-
cence was again considered by the Supreme Court in 1965 in Dixon
v. United States.186 In that case, the taxpayers argued that they
relied upon a Commissioner's acquiescence and only after the
transaction was complete was the acquiescence withdrawn. 87 In
Dixon the Court ruled that taxpayers were not justified in relying
on an acquiescence because the Commissioner was empowered to
retroactively apply the "correct law" in order to rectify an "under-
lying mistake."' 88 The Court also based the Commissioner's au-
thority to give an acquiescence retroactive effect on the fact that
until 1953 the cumulative announcements of acquiescence and
nonacquiescence were given Revenue Ruling numbers. The Court
stated that the reasons supporting the Commissioner's power to
retroactively revoke his regulations apply "with even greater force
to ... rulings and acquiescences."' 89 The Commissioner has the
authority to revoke an acquiescence retroactively under the Code,
as well.1 90
Any taxpayer who relies on any interpretation of tax law other
than a Supreme Court decision or the current Commissioner's po-
sition is vulnerable. In 1940, the Supreme Court ruled that a tax-
payer could not rely upon decisions of four courts of appeals and
consistent Tax Court cases with respect to a specific question, be-
cause the Commissioner had not acquiesced.191 In a 1978 case, the
185. If there ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis
should govern, this is it. Aside from the obvious hardship involved in
treating the taxpayers in the present cases differently from many
others whose cases have been decided or closed in accordance with
the settled rule, there are the weightier considerations that the judg-
ments now rendered disappoint the just expectations of those who
have acted in reliance upon the uniform construction of the statute
by this and all other federal tribunals ....
Id. at 129 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
186. 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
187. In Dixon, the taxpayers argued that since they had relied on an 1944 acquies-
cence to Caulkins v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 656 (1943), aff'd, 144 F.2d 482 (6th
Cir. 1944), they should not be liable for 1952 taxes imposed retroactively by
withdrawal of the acquiescence in 1955. 381 U.S. at 73, 76.
188. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had the right to revoke the
acquiescence retroactively and observed that a notice is published in Internal
Revenue Bulletins that "rulings other than Treasury Decisions ... do not
commit the Department to any interpretation of the law," and concluded that
"the petitioners were not justified in relying on the acquiescence as preclud-
ing correction of the underlying mistake of law and the retroactive applica-
tion of the correct law to their case." 381 U.S. at 73, 76. See also Calechman,
supra note 9, at 123; New Developments, supra note 19, at 57.
189. Id. at 75.
190. I.R.C. § 7805(b).
191. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). The case involved the taxpayer's appeal
of a Second Circuit judgment, Smith v. Higgins, 102 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1939),
reversing a district court decision in the taxpayer's favor. The resulting rul-
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Tax Court decided that a subsequent Supreme Court decision up-
holding a Service regulation should be applied retroactively in
spite of taxpayer reliance which was supported by a Sixth Circuit
decision in effect at the time of the transaction in question. 192 The
Commissioner is also vested to make any modification merely pro-
spective.193 However, the Commissioner has rarely exercised this
power. Thus, taxpayers are cautioned not to rely upon acquies-
cences in tax planning.194
The Commissioner's right of reconsideration has had grotesque
results. In 1968, the Commissioner withdrew nonacquiescence to a
decision and reversed a position he had held since 1935.195 In a
similar situation, the Commissioner continued to fight the rule of
law laid down by the Tax Court for thirty years before admitting
that the Tax Court was right.196 One acquiescence was withdrawn
only after it had been in effect for 49 years.197
The question is simply what is more important: taxpayer reli-
ance upon a precedent so that plans can be made accordingly; or
the chance that a court might eventually follow the Commis-
sioner's point of view if pressed hard and long enough. 198 But-
tressed by Supreme Court backing, the Commissioner's
prerogative to change a position could continue to pose a dilemma
for the relying taxpayer.
D. Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is the final arbitrator of tax controversies.
Certorari may be granted when there is a conflict between two cir-
cuits 199 or when the issue is of great importance to the national
ing was that a sale without a business purpose of a wholly owned corporation
cannot, as a matter of law, give rise to a deductible loss.
192. C. Blake McDowell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 71 (1978).
193. The Code presently provides: "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if
any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws,
shall be applied without retroactive effect." I.R.C. § 7805(b). The Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of this section was to "avoid inequities."
Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 397 n.49 (1943). Dwan termed it the Com-
missioner's "equitable power." Dwan, supra note 20, at 597.
194. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
195. Nonacquiescence to Title & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 25 (1935),
.published in XIV-2 C.B. 43 (1935) was withdrawn and "acquiescence in result
only" substituted therefor. 1968-2 C.B. 3.
196. In 1962, the Commissioner withdrew a nonacquiescence to a decision issued
in 1932. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 163; Comment, supra note 14, at 277.
197. This case received acquiescence in 1929 and in 1978 the Commissioner with-
drew the acquiescence and substituted a nonacquiescence. 1978-2 C.B. 5 n.36.
198. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 163-64.
199. Sup. Ct. R. 19, 388 U.S. 927, 948 (1967).
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fiscal environment. 200 However, since review by writ of certiorari
is discretionary, not a matter of right, the Court hears few tax
cases. 20' For example, in 1978, only six civil tax cases were de-
cided.202 In the 1976 and 1977 October terms only ten and eleven
tax cases, respectively, were decided by the Court.203 The Court
may also hear questions of law by certificate from the courts of
appeal 20 4 and direct appeal may be taken whenever an Act of Con-
gress has been declared unconstitutional. 205
The current appellate system lacks a practical and reliable
method of authoritatively resolving tax questions within a reason-
able period of time.206 Because of the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code, judicial conflicts are more likely to arise in the tax
area.207 Since certiorari is often withheld until two or more cir-
cuits are in conflict, a tax issue may remain unresolved for a con-
siderable period of time.208 Even then, the Court may not grant
review and the inter-circuit clash may continue to create confu-
sion.209 Even when certiorari is granted to resolve such a conflict,
often many years pass before the Supreme Court renders its deci-
sion.210
Because questions of federal tax law interpretation are only
200. Comment, supra note 14, at 275.
201. In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained the rationale for not granting certiorari, despite an ap-
parent conflict in decisions, as follows:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ .... A deci-
sibn may satisfy all these technical requirements and yet may com-
mend itself for review to fewer than four members of the Court.
Pertinent considerations of judicial policy here come into play. A
case may raise an important question but the record may be cloudy.
It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illu-
minated by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for
ripening.
Id. at 917-18. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 1355.
202. 1978 IRS REPORT, supra note 2, at 13 (table entitled "Appellate Court Case
Record-Refund Litigation and Tax Court Cases").
203. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 n.4.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1976).
205. Id. § 1252.
206. The Senate Judiciary Committee attributed the delay in getting a final deci-
sion to the existence of various forums and disparate appellate review. SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
207. Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1049 (2d Cir. 1974).
208. Comment, Divine v. Commissioner: Collateral Estoppel and the Mutuality
Requirement in Federal Tax Litigation, 60 IowA L. REv. 1420, 1430 (1975).
209. By refusing to grant certiorari in tax matters until there is a conflict between
circuits, the Court has been criticized as tending to encourage continued liti-
gation in the very hope of producing the required conflict. See Griswold, The
Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Haxv. L. REV. 1153, 1155-57 (1944).
210. If decisions have been adverse to the Service, it may continue to litigate the
issue and insist that the tax returns be kept open until finally resolved,
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settled with finality by the Supreme Court, the Commissioner fre-
quently takes the position that a lower court decision has no bind-
ing effect on the Service's policies in other jurisdictions.2 1 ' The
Divine court pointed out that the uncertainty caused by the Serv-
ice's position is "exacerbated" by the fact that decisions of the
courts of appeals are not frequently reviewed by the Supreme
Court. 2 1 2
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to consider tax cases has
also been attributed to the feeling that the controversy might more
appropriately be resolved by Congress.21 3 Although Congress is
responsible for writing the tax laws, the Court is responsible for
resolving any controversy which has resulted.2 1 4 It is for the Court
to interpret the meaning of a law or the intent of the Congress that
passed it.215
E. Certainty, Uniformity and Equity
Certainty and uniformity-as compelling to taxpayers as "right-
ness"--cannot be achieved if conflicts are encouraged and finality
unconscionably postponed.2 16 Rather than suffer through the liti-
gation in four or five circuit courts in an effort to achieve a "right"
answer, many bewildered taxpayers would be quite content to ad-
just to the first decision, at least until the Supreme Court or Con-
gress acted.2 17 Retroactive nonacquiescence itself undermines
whatever certainty exists in tax planning. It is contrary to the uni-
formity principle and tends to lessen public confidence in "fair and
whether it takes 5, 10, or even 15 years. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
See also Surrey, supra note 78, at 416.
211. Comment, supra note 208, at 1430.
212. Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1049 (2d Cir. 1974).
213. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissent, wrote:
This Court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to resolve
income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the taxpayers.
The reasons are (1) that the field has become increasingly technical
and complicated due to the expansions of the Code and the prolifera-
tion of decisions and, (2) that we seldom see enough of them to de-
velop any expertise in the area. Indeed, we are called upon mostly to
resolve conflicts between the circuits which more providently should
go to the standing committee of the Congress for resolution.
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
214. This raises interesting questions regarding the Court's constitutionally as-
signed role to resolve cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
215. This is the philosophy expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan. B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 135, at 57.
216. Surrey, supra note 78, at 419.
217. Many tax questions are no nearer a "right" answer after several circuits have
litigated the issue than when the first court announced its decision. Mean-
while bewildered taxpayers are forced to struggle along until the Supreme
Court selects the best alternative or Congress works its will. Id.
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even-handed treatment" at the hands of the Commissioner. At a
minimum the Commissoner should be bound by the decision until
it is withdrawn.2 1 8
In a concurring opinion to a 1945 Supreme Court case, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter asserted that the Tax Court decision should be ac-
corded finality if the issue is one "peculiarly within the
competence of the Tax Court ... and that court has given a fair
answer."2 19 In a voluntary tax system the taxpayer should be able
to rely on court determinations, but the Commissioner's nonac-
quiescences leave taxpayers in doubt as to the state of the law
even after adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Many taxpayers question the validity of the Commissioner's
entire nonacquiescence program. The Commissioner has been fol-
lowing a practice of not appealing many of the nonacquiesced deci-
sions. 2 20 Thus the taxpayer is left in a quandary as to what the
nonacquiescence means in a particular case, even though certainty
is one of the Service's stated justifications for its acquiescence pro-
gram. The theory is advanced that if the Commissioner acqui-
esced in a rule of law on its first decision in one of the courts, other
courts might later decide related issues differently, and uncer-
tainty would result. This argument begs the issue since the acqui-
escence would be binding on all Service personnel and when the
decision has the effect of reducing revenue and benefiting the tax-
payer, taxpayers would never press the issue in the courts
again.221
218. Comment, supra note 3, at 565.
219. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 384 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Ordinarily, tax questions as to reasonableness of business ex-
penses are for the Tax Court as the trier of fact and even mixed questions of
law and fact will be set aside by reviewing courts only when the facts fall
short of meeting statutory requirements. Although a Tax Court's decision is
to be given great weight by the appellate court, a question of law is review-
able on appeal. Id. at 370-71.
220. The Office of Chief Counsel provided the following information regarding the
record fifty-three nonacquiescences in 1978:
[01ur records indicate that 32 were appealed by the Commissioner.
Appeal was recommended by the Commissioner in 12 additional
cases; two of these were settled by the parties prior to the filing of an
appeal; appeals of the other ten were abandoned after consultation
with the Department of Justice. One of the cases on the list (McDow-
ell) was appealed by the taxpayer. Certain other cases-e.g., Kee-,
Lennard, and Squier-represent instances in which a change of
Service position has necessitated the announcement of a nonacqui-
escence to replace an earlier published acquiescence, the time for
appeal, of course, having long expired.
Menzel letter, supra note 35.
221. When the effect of a decision is merely to reduce taxes, as opposed to shifting
the burden between two taxpayers, the argument that certainty is advanced
cannot explain nonacquiescence, for if the Commissioner acquiesced, that is-
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The practical effect of binding the Commissioner to an interpre-
tation is the possible impact upon the efficient collection and max-
imization of federal revenue. 222 While Congress created the Tax
Court to lessen the financial burden of judicial review,223 the Com-
misssioner's policy of nonacquiescence effectively negates that ad-
vantage. Even if certiorari were to be granted, the additional delay
and expense would probably be too much for the average tax-
payer.224
The Commissioner has a responsibility to treat the identically
situated taxpayers consistently.225 This duty should not be ig-
nored simply to permit the Service an additional chance to win a
contested point of law.226 Inconsistency in the treatment of tax-
payers adversely reflects on the "stability and rationality" of the
tax system, 2 2 7 while consistency has the opposite effect.22 8 Thus,
notwithstanding the limitation of applicability of a private ruling to
the taxpayer to whom issued, another taxpayer is entitled to have
his request governed by the same standard of equality and fair-
ness. 229 An example of inconsistent treatment occurred in 1965
when a company sought the same favorable treatment afforded the
only competing producer of the type of device affected by a Service
ruling.230 The Court of Claims noted that the plaintiff had
promptly asked for its own ruling, and yet the Service refused to
act for well over two years.231 Since the Service provided the com-
petitor a favorable ruling after only two days of deliberation, a
sue would never be litigated again. See New Developments, supra note 19, at
58.
222. deY. Manning, supra note 105, at 360-61.
223. Note, supra note 15, at 415.
224. Id.
225. The Second Circuit stated:
[TJ he Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly situ-
ated taxpayers; [and cannot concede a point of law] . . .in one case
and, without adequate explanation, dispute it in another having
seemingly identical facts .... That the Commissioner's seeming in-
consistency may have arisen from the right hand's ignorance of the
posture of the left is little solace to taxpayers ... disadvantaged by
the discrimination ....
Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1973).
226. Note, supra note 53, at 618.
227. Id. at 619.
228. According to Nevitt, "[o]ne of the main reasons that our system of income
taxation works successfully is the general attitude of most taxpayers that
they do not mind paying taxes so long as everyone else is similarly taxed."
Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES
311, 312 (1956).
229. Calechman, supra note 9, at 122.
230. International Bus. Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. CL 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
231. Id. See also Calechman, supra note 9, at 122-23.
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standard of equality and fairness required similar treatment for
the plaintiff. Then-Chief Counsel Hauser stated: "it must be kept
in mind that it is the responsibility of the Service to assure uni-
formity in treatment to taxpayers .... [However,] it must also be
remembered that it is the responsibility of the Service to protect
the national revenue."2 3 2 Yet a uniform interpretation of tax laws
is more important than the Commissioner's insistence on protect-
ing the revenue. 233
The rationale usually used to support administrative rulings, in
general, is that they are official pronouncements by the experts
charged with the proper administration of the law. But "Proper ad-
ministration" should connote an impartial construction-not one
which is always favorable to one side.234 As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter wrote, "[elven tax administration does not as a matter of
principle preclude considerations of fairness. 2 35 The policy of
nonacquiescence enables the Commissioner to press further "his
unfair advantage in tax litigation."23 6 Although the Service claims
that it will desist after two adverse decisions, experience has
shown a great reluctance to give in when a large amount of reve-
nue is at stake. This attitude has been characterized as a "soak-
the-taxpayer" policy based on a devotion to dollars rather than
principles of law or equity.23 7
The taxpayer is placed in the dilemma of having to predict the
position the courts will take. The court will weigh whether equi-
ties lie with enforcing the right of the citizen to expect that his gov-
ernment will "always be a gentleman," or with the need for the
government to protect the federal treasury. When, in a 1951 case,
the taxpayer relied upon the courts' interpretation of the law, rep-
resentations by the Commissioner, and apparent acceptance by
Congress, the court held that "[t] axpayers expect, and are entitled
to receive, ordinary fair play from tax officials." 238 If taxpayers do
not believe that their tax will be fairly assessed by the Service, the
232. Hauser, Litigation Policy of the Chief Counsel in Civil Tax Cases, 14 TAx Ex-
EcUTrvE 218, 227 (1962). In support, Marcosson writes: "No matter how
strongly one may feel that construing tax legislation is part of the judicial
process, the fact remains that the Supreme Court itself feels... a more prac-
tical approach [ie: fiscal necessity?] must be made by the courts to tax laws
than to other statutes." Marcosson, supra note 95, at 174.
233. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 164; Comment, supra note 14, at 280; see gener-
ally Nash, What Law of Taxation?, 9 FORDHAM L REV. 165 (1940).
234. Cole, supra note 165, at 569.
235. Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293, 297 (1945).
236. In the event of repeated defeats, the Commissioner continues to persist in
urging upon the courts the Service's interpretations. Comment, supra note
14, at 278.
237. Surrey, supra note 78, at 399; Comment, supra note 14, at 278.
238. Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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voluntary compliance system will fail: the taxpayer who loses
faith in the system will seek ways to avoid his fair burden of taxa-
tion.239 Thus, it is questionable whether the Commissioner's non-
acquiescence policy is calculated to comport with high taxpayer
confidence in the Service.240
Most taxpayers cannot afford the expense of contesting the
Commissioner's construction in court. Furthermore, the realiza-
tion that they are the victims of a policy antagonistic to their best
interests will neither stimulate the attitude of voluntarism nor fos-
ter a spirit of patriotism on their part when they submit their re-
turn. Without that cooperation, the cost of collection will increase
and revenues will fall. 24 1 Possibly the loss will exceed that which
would have been experienced if a more even-handed approach to
tax administration was taken.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Tax critics have expressed much displeasure with the Commis-
sioner's nonacquiescences which are coupled with a decision not
to appeal. "It seems incongruous to allow the Commissioner to re-
fuse to accept a decision, and yet not require him to appeal.' ' 24
They state that if the Commissioner does not appeal, the decisions
should be binding in the future.243 By not being required to ap-
peal, the Commissioner is able to maintain a position inconsistent
with court precedents, Congressional intent, and even Treasury
Department rules and regulations. 244 Thus, "[t]o this extent the
Commissioner, for all practical purposes, stands above the courts
and exercises his own judicial function. '245 However the commis-
sioner asserts that the "nonacquiescence, no appeal" policy is jus-
tified by the limited availability of Supreme Court review.246
According to Former Chief Counsel Uretz, it is only on "rare occa-
sions [that] the Service will issue a nonacquiescence but not ap-
peal a decision. It is our policy to avoid this equivocal action
239. Comment, supra note 14, at 280.
240. Id. at 274.
241. A study entitled, "Estimates of Unreported Income on Individual Tax Re-
turns," conducted at the Commissioner's request concluded that in 1976 indi-
viduals failed to report $75 to $100 billion of income from legal sources and $25
to $35 billion from criminal activities in narcotics, illegal gambling, and prosti-
tution. News Release, .LR.-2159 (Aug. 31, 1979).
242. Comment, supra note 14, at 277; accord, Comment supra note 3, at 558; see
also Herzberg, supra note 175, at 164; New Developments, supra note 19, at
58.
243. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 164.
244. Comment, supra note 14, at 277.
245. Id. at 277-78.




It has been suggested that the Commissioner either "take every
appeal possible from the first judicial determination of the issue or
publicly acquiesce in the decision." 24 The taxpayer's probability
of encountering a changed rule more than once would then be lim-
ited to those cases where the Supreme Court overrides the Com-
missioner's acquiescence. The appeal-or-acquiesce policy would
also answer the taxpayer's complaint on maximization of tax reve-
nues.
24 9
On the other hand, if the Commissioner is incapable of exercis-
ing rule-making powers impartially, reorganization may be called
for. 250 More objective application of the tax laws would result if
regulations were not written and promulgated by the Commis-
sioner, but rather by an administrative body which would include
representatives of taxpayers, practitioners, and the Congress. 251
In view of the large number of cases handled by the Tax Court and
the Supreme Court's reluctance to review tax cases, it has been
recommended that greatly increased review of tax cases by the
Supreme Court should be coupled with legislative denial of the
Commissioner's authority to disregard unreviewed appellate court
decisions. While this would lead to greater uniformity, it would
make the Supreme Court the de facto arbitrator of all tax contro-
versies, for a denial of certiorari would be equivalent to a decision
on the merits.252 This would also be a drastic departure from the
present meaning assigned to the denial of certiorari.25 3
One writer raises the question of whether or not the present
court setup for tax cases is antiquated.254 He notes that other
countries have taken tax cases out of the ordinary courts and have
established separate courts which "can act more speedily and with
more intimate knowledge of economic facts. '255
By far the most viable solution is the establishment of a United
States Tax Court of Appeals which would have exclusive interme-
diate appellate jurisdiction over all civil tax matters. The exist-
ence of such a court would alleviate the need for nonacquiescence
in cases where appeal was not available due to congested court cal-
247. Uretz, supra note 17, at 143.
248. New Developments, supra note 19, at 138.
249. Id.
250. R. PAUL, supra note 7, at 667.
251. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 162.
252. Comment, supra note 46, at 723 n.58; see also note 266 & accompanying text
infra.
253. See note 201 upra.
254. A. HERZBERG, SAVING TAXES THROUGH CAPrrAL GAINS 418-19 (1957).
255. Herzberg, supra note 175, at 164.
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endars,25 6 or the unavailability of Supreme Court review. 25 7
The establishment of a court of tax appeals has been recom-
mended and discussed for more than forty years25 8 and has been
considered during the current session of Congress. 25 9 In each ver-
sion of the bill, sitting judges 260 would be appointed who would
continue to serve as a judge on the circuit from which they were
appointed.26 1 The senate report notes that reassignment of judges
already sitting was in recognition of the fact that 152 new federal
judgeships just been created a year earlier in the Omnibus Judge-
ships Act,2 6 2 and the need to avoid creation of a "specialist" court
out of touch with other general areas of the law. At the same time,
it would give the judges appointed to the court an opportunity to
develop a special understanding and appreciation of tax mat-
ters.263 If uniformity is the primary goal, then the creation of a sin-
gle court of tax appeals becomes a compelling alternative.264 The
fear expressed that a specialized court would become unduly re-
ceptive to the Commissioner's own viewpoint would be mitigated
by the concurrent service on the federal circuit courts, thus en-
couraging a generalist's background and limiting the tour of duty
256. Comment, supra note 14, at 279.
257. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 n.4; see also note 135 supra.
258. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. Judge Traynor in 1938 and Dean Gris-
wold in 1944 recommended that the appeal of all tax cases heard in the Tax
Court and district courts be taken to a new tribunal. See, e.g., Chaplin &
Brown, A New United States Court of Tax Appeals: S. 678, 57 TAXES 360
(1979); Griswold, supra note 209; Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85
YALE L.J. 228 (1975); Pope, A Court of Tax Appeals; A Call for Reexamina-
tion, 39 A.B.A. J. 275 (1953); Surrey, supra note 78; Traynor, Administrative
and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes-a Criti-
cism and a Proposal, 38 COLuM. I REV. 1393 (1938); Comment, supra note 14.
259. S. 1691, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4044, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S.
1691 was formerly title IV of S. 1477, a bill which would also create a new
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit formed by combining the present
Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Both S. 1477 and
S. 1691 were introduced by Senator Kennedy. Walker, Chairman's Report, 33
TAX LAWYER 1, 3 (1979).
260. The Senate bill calls for 11 judges to be appointed, one from each of the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals. S. 1691, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (b). The House
bill would add a twelfth from a new appellate court called the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. H.R. 4044, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a). The
Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association would prefer the tradi-
tional manner in which appointments are made by the President with the
consent of Congress. Walker, supra note 259, at 3; ABA Panel Discussion,
supra note 50, at 7.
261. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6. The judges would rotate on a periodic
basis. ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 16.
262. Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 (Supp. 1978); SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 5.
263. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.




As contrasted with the dozen or so tax cases the Supreme
Court hears, current estimates are that initially between 400 and
500 cases would be handled annually by the new appellate court.2 66
The Court of Claims jurisdiction over tax matters would be elimi-
nated.267 Although the decisions of the new court would be subject
to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari, such review would
continue to be a rare occurrence. 2 68
During the course of hearings on the Senate bill, a large
number of witnesses testified269 and, with few exceptions, most
were enthusiastic in their support of the proposed new court.270
Commissioner Kurtz had earlier lent his support to the propo-
sal,271 but when asked specifically whether or not the Service
265. The Senate version calls for a term of three years. S. 1691, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101(b) (1979). The House bill specifies a term of six years. H.R. 4044,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(b) (1979).
266. This estimate of 400 to 500 cases annually is based on a review of tax cases:
(1) filed in the Court of Claims, (2) appealed from district courts, and (3)
appealed from the Tax Court, for the period 1975 to mid-1979. Since a court
case may involve several taxpayer-litigants, the Committee adjusted the esti-
mate upward by using a conversion factor of 87% arrived at by an actual
count of a small sample of the cases. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 4 &
n.5.
267. Id. at 2. The Court of Claims is essentially a one-level, one-shot court. In the
past five years only one case from that tribunal has been heard on appeal by
the Supreme Court. ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 20.
268. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
269. The Treasury position was presented by John M. Samuels, Tax Legislative
Counsel:
On balance, the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service believe
that the advantages of a single court of tax appeals outweigh its dis-
advantages. We believe a single court of tax appeals would provide
for earlier resolution of tax issues, thereby mitigating the delay, un-
certainty and disparate treatment that occurs under the present sys-
tem.
[1979] FED. TAX CooRD. 2D, WEEKLY ALERT (R.IA.) 349.
Others testifying included: Senator Kennedy, the bill's sponsor; Maurice
Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General for Judicial Improvement; Erwin N.
Griswold; Mortimer M. Caplin; Donald C. Alexander; Randolph W. Thrower;
Charles M. Walker, on behalf of the American Bar Association; James B.
Lewis; Meade Emory; Robert E. McQuiston, Philadelphia Bar Association;
Sharon L. King, Chicago Bar Association; Donald F. Wood, Houston Bar As-
sociation; David G. Glickman, Texas Bar Association; and Vester T. Hughes,
Jr. 125 CONG. REC. D1478 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1979).
270. The structure and organization of the proposed new court caused it to receive
the broad, bipartisan support not given previous proposals for a tax court of
appeals. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 4.
271. The Commissioner stated:
Sitting where I do, I am in favor of the single court because I put a
heavy value on certainty. It is not healthy for the Service to continue
litigating cases and requiring taxpayers to go through the courts after
other courts have already decided that the taxpayers should win.
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would abandon nonacquiescences if the Court of Tax Appeals
were to come into being, Commissioner Kurtz hedged: "certainly
there would be less of a tendency and maybe no tendency at all
... to ignore decisions of the single court of tax appeals. Except in
very rare cases that would go to the Supreme Court, those deci-
sions will represent the final decision on that issue."272 Yet the
Chairman of the A.B.A. Section of Taxation Committee on Court
Procedure has taken a contrary view:
[B] ut I am prompted to ask this: Will creation of this new court really
remove from our vocabulary that dirty word, nonacquiesce? In short, will
the Service accept and follow every decision of this new court and not
preserve the issue for reconsideration, even though, in the Service's view,
the decision is clearly wrong ....
I submit that it won't .... We've all had experience with the Service
during our professional lifetimes and we know it is not likely that the
Service will abandon a position because of a decision that they think is
wrong or should be limited to its facts.
2 7 3
The prospect of a single national court of tax appeals holds prom-
ise of complete elimination of any remaining rationale for the non-
acquiescence program. Whether or not the Service concurs is
another matter.
The demise of the nonacquiescence program should be tied,
legislatively, to the creation of the new tax tribunal. An amend-
ment to the proposed Tax Court Improvement Act 274 which would
impose appropriate restrictions on the nonacquiescence program
may be necessary. The amendment should provide that: (1) the
Commissioner may only issue a nonacquiescence after having de-
cided to appeal the Tax Court decision to the United States Court
of Tax Appeals, and (2) representational expenses incurred in the
Tax Court be extended to successful taxpayer litigants and a suit
to contest a nonacquiescence be considered vexatious per se.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commissioner's nonacquiescence program is an anachro-
nism that has outlived its usefulness. It does not serve the original
purpose for which it was initiated in 1924; that of informing the vic-
torious taxpayer as to whether an appeal was or was not contem-
plated. Nor does it contribute to certainty in tax planning because
It is something we don't like to do. It is a burden on taxpayers and
there's little to justify it, except that, given the present system and
our faith that the law will move in the right direction, we have some
obligation to litigate further when we feel decisions are clearly
wrong.
ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 13.
272. Id. at 29.
273. Id. at 10.
274. S. 1691, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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of the equivocal manner in which the program is administered.
Not only may the Commissioner's position today change to-
morrow, but also we may find out tomorrow that today's position
was retroactively reversed.
It would appear, as one author has suggested, that the Commis-
sioner has indeed abused his administrative discretion in applying
the acquiescence procedures.2 75 It is particularly anomalous that
the rate of nonacquiescence-in 1978 over half of all cases lost by
the Service-should accelerate so long after the original reason for
the program has faded away. Secondly, the program is the antithe-
sis of the self-assessment theory upon which the U.S. tax system is
based. A wise policy of tax administration must include the nur-
turing of a willing attitude among taxpayers and be calculated to
impress upon them the seriousness of their obligation. 276 As the
Service points out, a voluntary system can only be successful if the
public image is a favorable one.277
The creation of a separate court of tax appeals would eliminate
appellate conflict since there would be only one court applying a
nationally uniform tax law to all taxpayers.27 8 It would reduce the
amount of tax litigation, provide for more certainty, and speed res-
olution of doubtful issues. 279
275. The Service must take steps to assure the public that it approaches problems
objectively, with a greater devotion to principles of law than to revenue.
Comment, supra note 14, at 280.
276. There has developed a tendency to mitigate the blame attributed to the Serv-
ice through the recognition that at times it is the taxpayer that may be at
fault. Surrey, supra note 78, at 399.
277. Because it is operated as a self-assessment system, public confidence in the
good faith of the government is more essential in tax administration than in
any other governmental function and enforcement activities should be di-
rected with this focus in mind. Comment, supra note 14, at 274.
278. Note, supra note 15, at 415.
279. ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 50, at 15.
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